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IJCAI-ECAI Workshop on Artificial Intelligence Safety (AISafety) 2022

Privacy Safe Representation Learning via Frequency Filtering Encoder

A low-pass frequency filtering module in the client-side encoder limits what a reconstruction attacker can recover, strengthening privacy while preserving task utility.

Jonghu Jeong1 Minyong Cho1 Philipp Benz1 Jinwoo Hwang1 Jeewook Kim1 Seungkwan Lee1 Tae-hoon Kim1

1Deeping Source Inc.

Why this matters

Existing defenses leak

A trained reconstruction attacker can recover the original image from obfuscations produced by existing adversarial representation learning (ARL) methods.

Frequency filtering

A low-pass filtering module restricts the information the encoder can carry in the frequency domain, reducing what an attacker can reconstruct.

Better privacy-utility trade-off

The method withstands reconstruction attacks while outperforming prior state-of-the-art methods on the privacy-utility trade-off.

Low-pass filtering narrows the information available to a reconstruction attacker while preserving useful task representations.

Abstract

Deep learning models are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. These models are often deployed on the server-side and receive user data in an information-rich representation to solve a specific task, such as image classification. Since images can contain sensitive information, which users might not be willing to share, privacy protection becomes increasingly important. Adversarial Representation Learning (ARL) is a common approach to train an encoder that runs on the client-side and obfuscates an image. It is assumed, that the obfuscated image can safely be transmitted and used for the task on the server without privacy concerns. However, in this work, we find that training a reconstruction attacker can successfully recover the original image of existing ARL methods. To this end, we introduce a novel ARL method enhanced through low-pass filtering, limiting the available information amount to be encoded in the frequency domain. Our experimental results reveal that our approach withstands reconstruction attacks while outperforming previous state-of-the-art methods regarding the privacy-utility trade-off. We further conduct a user study to qualitatively assess our defense of the reconstruction attack.

Framework at a glance

Overview of the frequency filtering encoder for privacy-preserving image obfuscation
A client-side encoder obfuscates the input image, and a frequency filtering module (Fourier transform → low-pass filter → inverse Fourier transform) removes private information before transmission. The encoder is trained against a task network and a proxy adversary; at inference the server runs only the task network, and an attacker may try to reconstruct the image.

Reconstruction attack

Reconstruction attack results on CelebA for Noise, LP, U-Net, DISCO, and the proposed method
Reconstructions from a trained attacker on CelebA. A successful defense should reveal neither the identity nor the private attribute (gender). Noise, U-Net, and DISCO leak both; our method yields gender-neutral faces.

Main results

45.8% user-study gender accuracy on our reconstructions (near chance)
>90% user-study gender accuracy on Noise, U-Net, and DISCO reconstructions

Citation

BibTeX

@article{jeong2022privacy,
  title={Privacy Safe Representation Learning via Frequency Filtering Encoder},
  author={Jeong, Jonghu and Cho, Minyong and Benz, Philipp and Hwang, Jinwoo and Kim, Jeewook and Lee, Seungkwan and Kim, Tae-hoon},
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.02482},
  year={2022},
  note={IJCAI-ECAI Workshop on Artificial Intelligence Safety (AISafety)}
}